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Introduction 
On the assessment of world economists, Public Infrastructure Investments are able to pay 
for themselves.  Cost of a dollar generated by Public Investments is less than a cost of a dollar 
flown in the economy at the expense of government tranche, equity financing or tax subsidy 
(Summers 2014). Moreover, Public Infrastructure Investments attract Private Investments into 
related projects around this infrastructure.  
The Public-Private Partnership is a convenient mechanism to sophisticate the process of 
involving investors into the infrastructure projects. 
However, it is important to understand that PPP contracts, especially, concession 
agreements are mainly long-term projects. As a rule, predictability is indispensible for long-term 
projects. That is why one of the directions of the Government’s Action Plan1 is the creation of 
general predictable conditions, both from the point of view of macroeconomics and from the 
point of view of microeconomic activity (Department of Investment Policy and Public-Private 
Partnership Development, Ministry of the Economic Development of the Russian Federation 
2017). It is vital to successful business engagement into PPP to determine conditions under 
which investors would prefer operate.  
Specification of the existing Russian methods allowing evaluation of those regional 
conditions can lead to the lack of “customization” in PPP policy in terms of business implication. 
Client-oriented methodology should aim assessment of the PPP Critical Success Factors from the 
position of investors and detect which factors matter for the private partner in decision-making. 
The basic regional assessment methods, the PPP development regional rating (Association “PPP 
development center”) and the National rating of the investment climate in the regions of Russia 
(the Agency of Strategic Initiatives) are directed on the evaluation of executive bodies’ efforts on 
the PPP development in the regions of Russia. 
The main purpose of the paper is identification of PPP Critical Success Factors boosting 
private sector involvement in PPP projects in the Russian regions.  
In order to determine the possibilities of achieving this purpose it is necessary to answer 
the main research question, in particular, whether there is similar interrelation between investors’ 
attitude to the level of PPP Critical Success Factors’ development in the region and their 
involvement in the provision of public services there for the low and high PPP-developed 
regions.  
The initial research hypothesis is that investors who participate in the provision of public 
services and investors who do not take part differ in their perception of the certain risks’ power.  
Research objectives 
                                                          
1
 Government’s Action Plan for 2017. URL: http://government.ru/docs/25996/  
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1. To determine what PPP Critical Success Factors are most widespread in the literature 
and check whether they matter in terms of the Russian business environment. 
2. To analyze how business estimates PPP Critical Success Factors in different Russian 
regions. 
3. To detect whether the business representatives who are involved in provision of public 
services in the region and those who are not involved differ in their evaluation of Critical 
Success Factors. 
4. To make a regional “portrait” of the Russian investor from the aspect of his attitude to 
the factors which are critical to the PPP project success.  
The research object is the business Involvement Status in provision of public services in 
the regions of Russia.  
The subject is connection between private sector’s perception of PPP Critical Success 
Factors and readiness to participate in provision of public services in the Russian regions. 
Theoretically, the paper contributes to the pull of information required for creating a 
government PPP development policy directed on attracting investors into PPP projects in the 
Russian regions. The practical output presents a regional investors’ portrait toward their PPP 
Critical Success Factors’ evaluation. This summarizes the PPP Critical Success Factors which are 
associated with investors’ decision to participate in PPP at the regional level. 
The research is based on both qualitative and quantitative methods. Chapter 1 is a 
qualitative analysis implying summary of approaches to the PPP project Critical Success Factors. 
Revealing of the essential conditions making the PPP project implementation successful is 
fundamental to this paper concerning its main purpose. The first paragraph reflects theoretical 
concepts of Critical Success Factors as well and summarizes universal factors meaningful 
through the whole PPP process. The second paragraph presents description of the PPP project 
stages and their specifics including Critical Success Factors relatively to each stage.  
Chapter 2 synthesizes existing PPP success evaluation methods both in project and 
regional authority effectiveness. The first paragraph in this Chapter is an overview of different 
assessment methods and it results in PPP success evaluation methods classification based on 
formulated criteria. The next paragraph investigates presence of PPP effectiveness assessment 
methods which comply with two criteria simultaneously: 1) applicable at the regional level 2) 
business-oriented. The last paragraph of Chapter 2 explains research methodology applied to 
answer the main research question in terms of Master’s thesis writing. Proposed there 
econometrical method of analyzing categorical data fits methodology criteria claimed above. 
The Chapter 3 is a practical implementation of announced methodology. The first 
paragraph demonstrates descriptive statistics. This makes a picture of how investors evaluate 
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Financial Availability of PPP, quality of selection process, regional legislation and other critical 
factors in formed clusters. Those clusters group more than one thousand respondents from 37 
Russian regions participating in the survey. The next paragraph is econometrical testing of 
hypothesis about association between factors’ evaluation and participation in provision of public 
services within clusters. The last paragraph provides by results of research with a regional 
investor’s portrait characterizing which Critical Success Factors are significant in investors’ 
decision making about participation in PPP in observed regions. 
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1. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS OF PPP CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS  
1.1 Universal Critical Success Factors in PPP   
Chapter 1 is dedicated to the plurality of points of view on the PPP Critical Success 
Factors. The first paragraph explains a notion of the Critical Success Factors (CSFs) and 
accumulates universal PPP Critical Success Factors prevailing in the literature. In research 
context, universality of PPP Critical Success Factor presumes that this factor is equally important 
through all PPP project steps. For examples, project economic viability matters for the investors 
during the whole implementation process. Therefore, such PPP Critical Success Factor is defined 
as universal. In turn, the second paragraph explores PPP specifics and focuses on the PPP 
Critical Success Factors in relevance to PPP project stages. In this case, the factor is considered 
to be specific if its presence is more important for success on some particular stage, as, for 
example, Transparent Selection Process is vital to successful tendering.  
The pioneers of CSFs interview method, Bullen and Rockart (1981, 7) characterize CSFs 
as “the few key areas where “things must go right” for the business to flourish and for the 
manager’s goals to be attained”.  With regard to the more recent papers, the concept is very 
similar: CSFs are defined as core elements included in process of achieving target results by the 
organizations (Madar and Hamid 2014). Researches on the organization’s CSFs can result in a 
guide for the organization to measure its success (Borman and Janssen, 2013). In other words, 
CSFs represent a number of core points to concentrate on achieving success. Success can be 
measured in different ways and one of the mostly used interpretations is that project success 
measure is a degree of getting project’s desirable outcomes (Osei-Kyei et al. 2017). 
 The nature of CSFs is following. Whether the factor is critical is determined by 
manager’s “subjective judgement” (Bullen and Rockart 1981, 11). The same point of view is 
supported nowadays by Węgrzyn (2016). There is no particular scheme of CSFs determination. 
According to Chan et. al (2010), a thorough literature review on PPP critical succeed factors has 
been done and CSFs vary on different levels of managing.  
The summarizing Table 1 based on Chan et al. (2010) includes PPP Critical Success 
Factors most frequently mentioned in the literature from 1994 till 2006. Chan (2010) analyzed 
which Critical Success Factors are discussed most frequently in the literature for the period 
mentioned above. The main findings in refer to the articles analyzed are presented in the Table 1. 
Table 1 - Most widespread PPP CSFs from 1994 till 2006 
PPP Critical Success Factor The authors 
Number of 
citations 
Competitive and transparent Li et al.(2005), Jefferies (2006), Corbett and 7 
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procurement process Smith (2006), Zhang (2005), Qiao et 
al.(2001), Jefferies et al. (2002), Gentry and 
Fernandez(1997). 
Project economic viability 
Li et al.(2005), Abdul-Rashid et al.(2006), 
Corbett and Smith (2006), Zhang (2005), Qiao 
et al.(2001), Nijkamp et al.(2002), Tam et 
al.(1994), Tiong(1996),  
8 
Available ﬁnancial market 
Li et al.(2005), Corbett and Smith (2006), 
Zhang (2005), Jefferies et al. (2002), Akintoye 
et al.(2001). 
5 
Strong private consortium 
Abdul-Rashid et al.(2006), Corbett and Smith 
(2006), Zhang (2005), Jefferies et al. (2002), 
Tam et al.(1994), Tiong(1996), Grant(1996). 
7 
Good partners’ relationship 
Abdul-Rashid et al.(2006), Corbett and Smith 
(2006), Zhang (2005), Tam et al.(1994), 
Grant(1996). 
5 
Strong Government Support 
Abdul-Rashid et al.(2006), Corbett and Smith 
(2006), El-Gohary et al.(2006), Jamali(2004), 
Tam et al.(1994), Kanter(1999). 
6 
Stable and transparent 
political / social situation 
Qiao et al.(2001), Nijkamp et al.(2002), 
Jamali(2004), Tam et al.(1994), 
4 
      Appropriate project         
identiﬁcation (Clear project 
brief and client requirements) 
Jefferies (2006), Corbett and Smith (2006), 
Jamali(2004), Qiao et al.(2001), Tam et 
al.(1994), Tiong(1996). 
6 
Source: Based on Chan (2010). 
Nowadays, researchers apply to different approaches to PPP Critical Success Factors 
interpretation. Further, there is an overview of recent publications on PPP CSFs dated 2009-
2017. 
One of the widespread PPP Critical Success Factors discussed in the literature is 
stakeholders’ credit accompanying successful PPP project from the initiation’s stage to the 
project completing (Chowdhury, Chen, and Tiong 2015).  The authors analyzing PPP in power 
production mention decision-making factors for five major groupings by credit enhancement, 
such as shareholders, host governments, society, multi-lateral development banks, export credit 
agencies and other parties. For example, shareholders will appreciate transparency and easiness 
of the procedure of special purpose vehicle’s registration and development banks will tend to 
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mitigating political risks in countries of capital inflows. In turn, failure to incorporate credit 
enhancement mechanism covering the interests of meaningful investors can lead to uncertainty 
of debt servicing to investors and, eventually, their unwillingness to participate in a project 
(Chowdhury, Chen, and Tiong 2015). The social factors are defined as Social Justice according 
to Cornelius and Wallace (2010), assuming that one of the best ways to detect whether the 
quality of good productions is satisfying is to attract society into justice procedures. 
Knowledge management plays quite significant role in PPP success. Valuable lessons 
could be derived from previous projects and accumulated to avoid previous mistakes due to right 
risk allocation. Chou et al. (2012) use case study method to accumulate the relative importance 
of the potential Critical Success Factors in different countries and examine those in Taiwan 
infrastructure PPP projects. For instance, PPP pioneers in Great Britain underline such factors as 
a strong and good private consortium, appropriate risk allocation and available ﬁnancial 
market. The risks identified by China researchers include corruption, government intervention, 
expropriation and nationalization. 
Evaluation of restrictive competition in PPP projects with real options is suggested by 
Jicai Liu, Yu, and Cheah (2014). The main idea of restrictive competition is to make guarantees 
to investors that no other company will be allowed to build similar facilities, speaking, for 
example, about construction industry, during some period after PPP project launch. In the 
opposite case, if it turns out that market needs more service than it was anticipated before, the 
public side considers constructing new facilities despite agreement about restrictive competition 
to the initial facility. Such a scenario could be compensated accordingly. The value of 
compensation is the value of the real option owned by the project company. The scheme works 
in the following way: government guarantee payment is risk free and based on the market 
necessities. If it is surplus, the government will be paid taxes from private investor’s extra 
revenue and observe restrictive competition rules. If market experiences shortage, the private 
investor will get financial compensation along appearing of new private investors at the existing 
market. As a real example of restrictive competition, in the Channel Tunnel project, the British 
and French governments promised to the project company that there will be no other similar 
projects during the next 33 years. 
Another grouping of Critical Success Factors relates to the Relationship Management 
aspects. The Relationship Management main postulates focus on project performance and client-
orientation in partnering. This approach maintains sustainable relationships between 
counterparties and creates superior value for the PPP project. Developing sustainable partner 
relationships is important because PPP contracts are often long-term and the circumstances 
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might change while project duration. Considering this assumption, the faster compromise will be 
found, the less risks of project breaks could be. 
According to the empirical questionnaire survey by Zou et al. (2014) the critical factors to 
successful Relationship Management in PPP are commitment and participation of senior 
executives, defining the objectives of the Relationship Management strategy and integration of 
the divisions of the organization. At the same time, the survey findings reveal that the 
Relationship Management role in PPP is underestimated and the most difficult change is to 
increase senior management commitment.  
However, the top management involvement should be stimulated as well as the synergy 
of interconnection between public and private sectors need to be developed. Their interaction 
becomes more and more interdependent that requires strong engagement of both parties. 
Liu Jicai et al. (2016) address the issue of the incentives of the opportunistic behavior of 
the private investors in PPP projects. Research findings confirm the cause of opportunism and 
the authors come up with recommendations how to struggle for “win-win” relationship between 
principal and agents.  
The principal-agent theory states that opportunistic behavior can appear when the 
information bridge between principal and agents has been damaged and principal side 
demonstrates low interest in its recovering. 
Next condition for opportunistic behavior is separation of the ownership from the 
operating right
2
. The agent is interested in deriving as much profit as it is possible before giving 
authority right back. That is why agents do not care much about long-lasting socio-economic 
effect.  
Another possible cause of opportunism is the situation when investors’ choice to 
participate in the project is under the risk of uncertainty, for example, his behavior strongly 
depends on some environmental factors concerning the project output.  
The empirical survey results demonstrate that investors’ inclination to opportunism is 
bound to own interests. Moreover, opportunistic behavior has the tendency to be acquired by 
surrounding investors. Considering these facts, it is better to predict and prevent opportunism 
than to fight against it. That is why the principals are advised to create additional incentives for 
agents (Liu Jicai et al. 2016). 
Investment attractiveness of PPP project also depends heavily on institutional factors 
(Deloitte 2009; Panayides, Parola and Lam 2014). The new institutional approach to studying 
Critical Success Factors in regard to PPP stages is presented in the next paragraph. However, it is 
                                                          
2
 In the Federal Law on Concession № 115, the principal owns the facilities controlled by the agent. After project 
term is finished, the agent transfers back facilities to the principal. 
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very narrow application of new institutional economics to suggest that PPP institutional factors’ 
are bound to specific PPP stages only. There are some basic determinants of PPP project success 
and attractiveness mentioned by institutional economists. Mostly, the governance (both 
normative and regulative) and market conditions define PPP project. There are governance 
indicators on the Figure 1 – Common institutional factors and PPP success (Panayides, Parola 
and Lam 2014). 
Figure 1 - Common institutional factors and PPP success 
 
Source: Panayides, Parola and Lam (2014). 
Voice and accountability reflects the ability of citizens to participate in selecting their 
government. The second one, government effectiveness presents quality of public services and 
the last one, regulatory quality characterizes the implemented policies (Panayides, Parola and 
Lam 2014). Policies creating excessive transaction costs are not successful in making pleasant 
investment climate.  
According to the Ernst & Young survey (2012), the main obstacles to a wider application 
of PPP in Russia are: non-compliance of federal legislation with modern requirements, poor 
quality of preparation of PPP projects and insufficient degree of readiness of the public and 
municipal authorities to realize Public-Private Projects and Municipal-Private Projects. It is 
interesting to note that representatives of the state bodies mark among the most important 
obstacles the underdevelopment of state institutions and their low degree of readiness to 
implement such projects. 
 In addition, underdeveloped government institutions are a signal of unhealthy 
governance system and existence of corruption. There is negative connection between the 
country’s corruption level and investors’ willingness to invest. This behavior is explained by the 
investors’ belief that poor quality of institutions leads to high risks of investment (Mota and 
Moreira 2015). 
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Economic freedom, competitiveness and unemployment rate (doing business indicators) 
are important as well as legal framework (government indicators) in attractiveness of PPP project 
establishment (Panayides, Parola and Lam 2014; Mota and Moreira 2015). 
Deloitte’s Russian PPP market surveys (2009; 2010) pinpoint three main conditions of 
attracting investments into PPP projects: well-developed regulatory framework, eligible financial 
instruments for investors and a system for allocating project risks and institutional framework 
including transparent and flexible tender process, availability of supporting infrastructure, for 
example, financial advisers, technical consultants as well as state support in the form of 
coordination and guarantees. According to the company surveys, the main requirement of 
investors is predictability and they also identify the following Critical Success Factors of 
attracting investors: presence of high barriers to entry to the market, the term of the main project 
agreement should exceed the loan terms (10-20 years), guarantee of regional authorities to 
maintain a certain customer base, tariff level or other payments for the term of the loan 
agreement, calculation of tariffs, currency risk reduction and compensation for preparing training 
costs at the beginning of the project’s operation stage. 
To sum up, there are many approaches to Critical Success Factors attracting investors and 
the world practice confirms the effectiveness of PPP mechanisms in financing investments. 
Taking into account the positive experience, it seems necessarily not only to support the basic 
conditions for the use of PPPs, but also to realize the advantages presented by this mechanism, 
both for government bodies, and for business. For PPP participants it is important to have an 
interest in this form of cooperation. For state and municipal bodies the interest may consist of 
increasing the tax base, creating new jobs, etc. Private business can be interested in services, 
from the provision of which investors can receive income taking into account minimum or 
acceptable risks.  
Distributing responsibilities between PPP participants should model the partnership in 
such a way to maintain control on the basis of a carefully drawn up document for target and 
regulatory regime for the provision of planned services. 
Along with this, it is important to note that achieving the desired results of PPP will be 
guaranteed more if the work on the use of this mechanism will be systematized and well-
organized. 
To sum up, the recent publications contribute into the concept of PPP CSFs developing 
existing directions and focusing on new factors reflecting behavior patterns of PPP participators. 
Such factors as stakeholders’ credit, strong private consortium, available financial market, 
competition (Bae and Yu-Min 2016) and Government Support follow the logic of CSFs 
discussed in the previous studies observed by Chan et al. (2010). Such trends as studying the 
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relationships between stakeholders, the nature of public partner’s commitment and senior 
managers’ engagement as well as accounting of social opinion triggered by development of 
Knowledge Management and Relationship Management in PPP. 
1.2 PPP project’s implementation process and its specific Critical Success Factors 
There are many approaches in the literature to the PPP stages terminology and Critical 
Success Factors influencing the project success on each particular phase. Basically, researches 
divide three general stages: project development, realization and operation (Zhang et al. 2015).  
The first one, Project Development stage, summarizes preparation steps needed for 
project launch. Usually project development starts with the project initiation and ends up at 
signing the PPP contract with the awarded private investor. This is quite generalized approach 
because there are some meaningful steps below the process from PPP initiative to the private 
partner selection. The project initiative has to be provided with the project design resulting in 
business plan including precise project description with technical and economical characteristics.  
Following the other core procedures at the project development stage, bidding goes after 
project design is approved. The competition is held to select the private partner and its specific 
depends on host country legislation. There are some basic PPP tenders’ forms in the international 
practice: direct negotiation, competitive tendering and competitive negotiation. The first one 
takes a place when the idea and initial initiative comes from the private investor. The two last 
represent forms of competition when the project was initiated by the public partner (Liu, Wang, 
and Wilkinson 2016). There also can be some pre-qualification selection before bidding to check 
whether applicants comply with the requirements underlying for the project. This step is 
concerned as Tendering in PPP project chronology version of Liu, Wang, and Wilkinson (2016). 
Some authors combine project design (feasibility stage) and tendering into the one stage 
defined as project development by Zhang et al. (2015). On the contrary, there are researches who 
divide project design and contract bidding into two separate stages called in different ways 
regarding their terminologies. For example, Ng, Yoki M.W. Wong, and James M.W. Wong 
(2012) suggest the first Feasibility stage devoted to project design and next Tendering as the 
second stage. Following this conception, Love et al. (2015) propose Initiation and Planning as 
the first PPP project stage, synthesizing feasibility study, definition of output and risk allocation 
and characterize the second stage as Procurement consisting of bidding, contract award and 
financial close.   
Turning to Zhang et al. (2015) structure, the second stage, Project Realization, embraces 
design, construction and commissioning. Business plan approved at the project development 
stage is a guiding line but the estimates of capital construction and other costs should be 
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computed and presented respectively. Project Realization can be treated as Managing Contract: 
Developing and Commissioning in some practical PPP guidelines (APMG International 2017) or 
partnership aiming design, build operations and facility management (Love et al. 2015). 
After contract is signed up with awarded private partner, the project is switching to the 
implementation (Project Realization and Operation stages according to terminology observed) 
and following exploitation supported by continuous monitoring and control. 
However, project implementation is under the influence of some factors (CSFs) which 
could influence the process on different stages described above.  
Such factors, as institutions, modes of organization, game rules, market conditions, 
technology, and history, influence the outcomes of PPP projects (Zhang, et al. 2015). Moreover, 
there are some specific factors which are deciding in each particular PPP stage. 
One of the comprehensive explanations of PPP success factors in relevance to PPP 
project stages is the New Institutional Economics Analysis. According to Zhang, et al. (2015) 
some framework is helpful to determination of vital factors on separate stages and computes the 
whole picture of forces directing PPP process. Studying these forces makes it possible to change 
the PPP stages outcomes increasing the effectiveness of the project as a whole. The authors 
examine a facilitating institutional environment for developing PPP projects success in China 
context. They evaluate evolution of PPP development in China analyzing legal, cultural, 
administrative environment and dividing existing institutions into formal and informal. 
The authors distinguish four levels of institutions concerning economic transactions and 
boundaries between PPP project stages.  
The first level presupposes Informal Environment full of local traditions, habits and 
unwrittern norms including business negotiation. Ignorance of informal institutes creates 
obstacles to partnering dialog between PPP project participants as well as between partners and 
final customers. 
The second level is clearer defined and presents Formal Institutions factor embedding 
property rights, legal system, red tape, administrative units.  
The third level covers Contractual Rules as loan agreements, supply contract and other 
deals supporting project implementation. Turning to PPP project chronology, formal institutions 
and contractual rules are unavoidable to deal with first of all on the project development and 
realization stages (Nisar 2013). Contract rules also spread further to realization and operation 
transactions. 
The fourth level refers to Employment, Resource Allocation and Quantitative Issues, such 
as pricing and other calculations and matters in project operation.               
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Figure 2 – PPP CSFs New Institutional Analysis’s framework  
 
Source: Zhang, et al. (2015) 
Institutional framework of PPP Critical Success Factors’ analysis allows determination of 
important conditions of PPP projects inhibiting or boosting project implementation. The authors 
assess the environmental impact particularly of formal and informal institutes on PPP 
development in Chine (Zhang et al. 2015).  
Cognitive style in China is characterized by dominance of social mentality and 
Confucianism presuming that the main purpose in achieving social prosperity is to distribute 
common wealth equally but not to allow wealth product and multiply itself naturally. This 
conception affects PPP embedding in China. For example, the Beijing International Airport Toll 
Express Highway, a PPP (concession) project has encouraged debate on its excessive toll 
charges and exorbitant profit when the figures were disclosed by the press. Private participation 
is perceived like “privatization” in the eyes of the society creating negative image around PPP in 
China. 
Another discovered problem is passing administrative procedures. The recent example of 
disagreement between administrative units in PPP development is light-rail PPP project 
approved by the City Development and Reform Commission (Grantor on behalf of the City 
Government). The project contract allowed commercial use of facilities as a financial subsidy to 
the investor. Nonetheless, when the investor made the project with office buildings on top of the 
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station terminal for sale as means for financing the project, the Urban Planning Bureau 
prohibited this activity because the land approved for the project could be used for the rail 
project only (Zhang et al. 2015). 
     Concerning these problems the authors advice investors in China to pay attention to 
the following things. High commitment to order and detailed laws requires signing up clear and 
elaborately complete contracts. Investors also need to check pitfalls of the administrative 
connections between the organizations involved in the project. Controversial relationships 
between some departments can embark some obstacles on implementation process.  
Speaking about each particular stage separately, at the initial project development 
(Feasibility) stage, the “triple win” scenario is positioned as the basis of PPP projects’ success 
by Ng, Yoki M.W. Wong, and James M.W. Wong (2012) and represents tacking into account 
interests kept by public sector, private consortium and general community. Questionnaire 
statistical survey results indicate that the most critical factor for evaluating the Feasibility of PPP 
projects regarding general community is an acceptable level of tariff. Cost Effectiveness and 
Financial Attractiveness are the most important evaluation criteria ranked by the public sector 
and private consortium respectively.  
Keeping balance of interests during long time is challengeable for Value-for-Money 
approach because stakeholders’ interests can change over time under financial, political, legal 
and social factors. Financial and commercial factors address existence of service need, 
government guarantee, existence of a strong team of consortium members, proﬁtability of 
project, stability of economic environment in the country, and ability of project to attract capital; 
Political and Legal factors treat first of all stability of political environment in the country, 
experience of government in PPP schemes and transparency of procurement system; Social 
factors presume public acceptance of the project, consistency of project with environmental 
issue, and price of service (Ng, Yoki M.W. Wong, and James M.W. Wong 2012). 
The following important stage, Tendering (selecting a competent firm or consortium with 
a sound technical solution) is based on value for money for the proposed projects.  
The quality and effectiveness of tendering procedures reflecting in value for money 
depends on some conditions and varies by countries.  Liu, Wang, and Wilkinson (2016) 
identified critical factors affecting the effectiveness and efﬁciency of tendering process in 
Public–Private Partnerships by comparative analysis of Australia and China. The choice of 
countries is explained by their principal difference in economic conditions: Australia is an 
example of a free economy and China is centrally planned one. The research results prove that 
there is discrepancy in meaningful critical factors for these two economical poles.  
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The issues as a level of transparency in tendering processes, governance structures, 
quality of project brief, robustness of business case development, public sector capacity and 
some others are critical to the effective tendering (Liu, Wang, and Wilkinson 2016; Wibowo and 
Alfen 2015).  
Governments should set up robust business case development procedures and clear 
methodologies. The transparent and consistent approach is indispensable when conducting 
investment plan and demand analysis. The whole perspective approach is preferable to 
fragmented decision making in government strategy and feedback. Unification of documents 
along with guidelines and determined policies gives clarity to the investors. For instance, the 
common legal framework is important, in particular, for Indonesia.  
Improving Risk Sharing and Investment Appraisal are crucial to the PPP Procurement 
stage according to Almarri and Blackwell (2014). In the PPP stage description above 
Procurement stage was identified as Tendering. However, Almarri and Blackwell (2014) 
presume that Procurement stage covers both Tendering and Project Realization steps. Their 
survey roots in peer-reviewed journals collecting PPP cases in constructing industry. Case study 
based research underlines necessity of considering the complexity of the projects and, firstly, the 
importance of contract renegotiations. The main postulates of the contract renegotiation theory 
are flexibility in balancing risks and rewards and avoiding renegotiation clause through 
flexibility in contract redesign. 
A flexible contract can be designed by means of making hybrid structure that changes 
contract terms providing vulnerable unstable environment (Jinbo, Honglian, and Wanli 2016). 
For example, put and call options discussed above are also mentioned in this survey as reliable 
financial instruments to cope with renegotiation clause: these tools solve the problem of new 
unexpected project changes including extra costs. Parties can terminate contracts at the agreed 
intervals. Usually government compensation some to the investors is bigger than they paid for 
put option. 
The second important condition of successful procurement of PPP project according to 
Almarri and Blackwell (2014) is Risk Calculation. The authors propose the usage of the Monte 
Carlo experiments method representing risk simulation method in real estate assessment. This 
technique is not as widespread as the Net Present Value approach in assessment of investment 
perspectives but has significant advantage. Net Present Value and following Sensitivity tests are 
static and characterize capital inflows and outflows very linearly. On the contrary, Monte Carlo 
experiments allow calculation of at least three possible scenarios for risk assessment on the basis 
of probability distribution and make more exact forecasts. This higher quality of predictability 
enables investors to prevent potential eventualities able to affect the project negatively. 
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Monte Carlo Simulation is mostly implicated in the areas requiring time and cost 
management, where quantification of risks is very sensitive to the project success (Almarri and 
Blackwell 2014). 
The completing step in PPP project realization process, Project Operation, means 
exploitation period and it is under the pressure of natural conditions, institutions, modes of 
organization, market conditions, technology etc. (Zhang et al. 2015).  
Concerning the fact that PPP Critical Success Factors vary on different project stages, it 
is necessary to make PPP success matrix visualizing PPP project stages and their specific success 
factors. 
Table 2 – PPP project stages and their Critical Success Factors 
 Feasibility. 
Project development. 
Project realization. 
Managing contract: 
developing and 
commissioning. 
Partnership. 
Project 
operation 
Project design. 
Initiation and 
planning 
Bidding. 
Tendering. 
Procurement. 
Contractual Rules - + + + 
Transparent 
Competition 
- + + + 
Governance 
Structure 
+ + + - 
Public Sector 
Capacity 
- + + - 
Quality of Project 
Brief 
+ + + - 
Robustness of 
Business Case 
Development 
(clear 
methodology) 
+ + + - 
Unification of 
Documents, 
Guidelines and 
Policies 
+ + + - 
Risk Calculation 
and Sharing 
- + + - 
Flexible Contracts 
(possibility of 
renegotiation) 
- + + + 
Cost Effectiveness 
and Financial 
Attractiveness 
+ + - - 
Natural Conditions - - + + 
Modes of 
organization 
- - + + 
Market Conditions, 
Stability of 
- + + + 
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Economic 
Environment in the 
country 
Technologies - - + + 
Public Acceptance 
of the Project 
- - + + 
Source: made by author. 
In conclusion, after an elaborate analysis of the universal and specific PPP Critical 
Success Factors, the most common factors in the literature are identified. It should be noted that 
such factors as Financial Availability, Transparent Tendering, Strong Public Support can be 
traced in the literature throughout the period observed (from 1994 to 2017). In modern studies, 
the new trends root in Knowledge Management and Relationship Management. Increasing 
attention is paid to the quality of the relationship between partners and the attitude of the 
population towards the quality of the services provided.  
The first paragraph addressing the issues of general conditions essential to the whole PPP 
project duration provides with different approaches to the universal PPP Critical Success Factors 
and discussing the problem of successful PPP implementation from different angles. 
The second paragraph incorporating PPP project’s Critical Success Factors respectively 
to its stages explains consequent PPP project steps in connection with their specific success 
factors crucial to understanding the complexity of PPP process and conditions supporting the 
process of project implementation. However, this approach does not open up the whole 
perspective of concepts and opportunities revealing the reserves of increasing PPP 
implementation success and making the project attractive for investments. 
That is why universal and specific PPP CSFs have been summarized combining observed 
concepts into the following headings presented in the Table 3 below. 
Table 3 - Summary of most widespread in the literature PPP Critical Success Factors 
PPP CSFs heading PPP CSFs discussed in the literature 
Financial Availability 
Project economic viability, available financial market, Cost 
effectiveness and financial attractiveness  
Transparency of 
Selection Process 
Transparency of procurement system, transparency of tendering, 
Transparent Selection Process, competitive and transparent 
procurement process 
Project Feasibility 
Quality of project brief, Unification of documents, guidelines and 
determined policies, clear project brief and client requirements, 
appropriate project identification, flexible contract 
Government Support Good governance, strong Government Support, laws, regulation, 
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decrees, bureaucracy, government incentives for preventing 
opportunism 
Social Support 
Public acceptance of the project, stable and transparent social 
situation, stakeholder’s credit, Voice and Social Accountability, 
Social Justice 
Source: made by author. 
The Table 3 reflects the summary of Chapter 1 results of outlining conceptual insights 
into PPP Critical Success Factors.  
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2. PPP SUCCESS EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Classification of PPP success evaluation methods 
Chapter 2 includes approaches to PPP success evaluation methods. In the first paragraph, 
the most common types of methods are presented, and then a classification of these methods 
based on the material studied is proposed. Such a classification will be a tool for defining Master 
Thesis’s research methodology focus and specifics. 
It is worthwhile of clarifying what the PPP success is before giving explanation of 
methods allowing its evaluation. As it is discussed in the Chapter 1, success measure in PPP is 
achieving of desirable outcome from participation in PPP project. The desirable outcome can 
vary depending on purposes of participation.  
Concerning assumed PPP success definition, PPP success evaluation methods refer to 
PPP effectiveness assessment methods as they measure degree of achieving project outcomes. 
There is a quite similar logic of PPP success measurement for both public and private 
partners: PPP project’s desirable outcome could be financial and other bonuses from 
participation in PPP. For these purposes (calculation of financial attractiveness), the public 
partner, for example, defines IRR, computes NPV and pay-back period as well as the private 
partner does. Both partners can also compare inputs and outputs from participation (Kurniawan, 
Mudjanarko, and Ogunlana 2015). Nurdiana, Wibowo, and Hatmoko (2015) propose Analytical 
Hierarchy method and Sensitivity Analysis for evaluation of PPP success. There are also 
universal techniques that are used mainly for a rough and rapid evaluation project evaluation for 
both the public and private partners such as Costs/Benefits Analysis (Tao and W. 2015; Trynov 
2016), analysis of Costs and Performance, in other words, Cost-Effectiveness analysis, and Cost-
Utility analysis (Tao and W. 2015). 
In international practice, Value for Money techniques is used to assess PPP project. The 
method involves the development of quality standards for good. Further, all the variants of the 
project implementation are evaluated from the point of view of the proposed indicators and are 
reduced to an integral quality index, and then correlated with the cost of the project 
implementation (Trynov 2016). 
However, private and public partners may focus on different priorities while making 
decisions by results of PPP project evaluation. Despite the common specifics of PPP success 
assessment tool, the final decision (by assessment results) of public partner can differ from those 
of the private partner. Greve and Hodge (2015, 10) discuss the problem of “enduring logic of 
PPP” widely. This phenomenon presumes PPP as a good policy if both public and private 
partners meet their interests at PPP mechanism implementation. The study discusses widely the 
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problem of pursue of different interests by business and public authorities collaborating as 
partners in PPPs. The authors emphasize some circumstances which turn the public partner to the 
different PPP focus. “Problem stream” comprises the public partner’s participation motive often 
measured in several ways. “Policy (solutions) stream” means selection process of economically 
viable projects from the projects’ pull initiated by business. The ideas change and replace each 
other time to time and the public partner is ready to support those trends which seem to survive 
in long-term competition. “Political stream” is based on macroeconomic conditions, public 
opinion and some “organized political forces” (Greve and Hodge 2015, 8). As one more aspect, 
business sometimes is interested in policy-making as well and the problem of interests’ lobbying 
can occur (Asha 2005). 
The public partner being a participant in the economic activity is interested in getting 
Social Effect of the overall results of the PPP project. Considering this potential outcome as a 
PPP project success measure, PPP project success can be evaluated through the project Public 
Effectiveness, which includes all aspects of the impact of the project on society. There are some 
methods concentrating on Public Effectiveness assessment:  
- Social Effectiveness assessment methods; 
- Environmental Effectiveness assessment methods; 
- Infrastructure Effectiveness assessment methods; 
- Effectiveness of Innovation assessment methods;  
- Budgetary Effectiveness assessment methods both in the direction of increasing 
revenues to the budget and reducing budget expenditures (Varnavskii 2004).  
Some of the directions that make up the public effectiveness of the project are difficult to 
express in quantitative terms, and to be evaluated by economic and mathematical methods, 
nevertheless, it is impossible not to take them into account when analyzing the effectiveness of 
PPPs. 
Among the methods for assessing the directions of Public Effectiveness of PPPs, Social 
Methods are for the evaluation of PPP success reflecting the satisfaction of the society (or some 
of its target group) with the results of the project, its relevance to the needs and goals of society, 
its core values. Such areas can be: increasing the level of employment of the population, raising 
the educational or spiritual level in society, raising the quality level of any social services, 
protecting the population from various threats. Evaluation of these areas can be done through a 
Comparative Analysis of the level of population satisfaction, before and after the implementation 
of the project. In practice, at the stage of preliminary analysis of the effectiveness of the project, 
such an assessment can be carried out through sociological surveys and surveys, taking into 
account the expectations and interests of members of society (Varnavskii 2004). 
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Considering the Environmental Effectiveness of PPPs, because of the diversity of the 
possible impact of enterprises on the environmental situation, it is difficult to single out a 
uniform methodology for calculating environmental effectiveness. Depending on the scope and 
specialization of PPPs, there are quite a number of criteria for assessing environmental efficiency 
(for example, the level of emissions per unit of output, absolute figures, total emissions, or 
reclaimed land areas, etc., indexed (relative ). Data presents descriptive data or information 
reduced to common units of measure, which allows comparing them with the selected standard 
or base value. Another kind of applicable data is weighted data that could be modified tacking 
into account its significance coefficient. In most cases, both for the preliminary evaluation of the 
project's effectiveness and for ongoing monitoring, it is most convenient to assess the level of 
environmental payments of the enterprise, before and after the project, or any stage (Fattakhova 
and Khakimova 2015).  
Switching to the evaluation methods of Infrastructure Effectiveness of PPP, it is 
worthwhile to consider infrastructure projects’ specific. They are characterized by considerable 
capital intensity and a long payback period of capital investments. As a rule, these are complex 
and large-scale projects. Another important characteristic of infrastructure project is high 
irreversible costs. This means that a significant part of the investment must be invested in the 
project at the very beginning, long before it starts making a profit (Maiello et al. 2011).  
To assess the effectiveness of the infrastructure project, it is firstly necessary to assess the 
security of the selected region with infrastructure facilities, the region's need for these facilities, 
for example, by comparing the availability of similar facilities in more developed regions having 
similar needs to the region chosen. 
When assessing the PPP effectiveness of innovations, direct and accompanying effects 
from innovation should be taken into account. Direct effects stipulate the achievement of the 
required technical characteristics, cost reduction, reduction in the timing of the implementation 
of projects, the development of new areas of activity. As for the accompanying effects, it is 
important to create innovation base, increase the professional and intellectual level of the staff, 
create a positive image of an innovative enterprise, which in modern conditions is a notable 
competitive advantage. 
 Thus, the Public Effectiveness of PPP at the stage of preliminary assessment should be 
analyzed from the perspective of the impact on society, with the involvement of expert opinions, 
sociological studies, comparative analysis with similar implemented projects, developed by the 
international and domestic practice. 
Moving to Financial Interest, decisions made by public and private partners on the base 
of the same assessment of financial result can be different. The public partner may be interested 
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in the implementation of the project with zero NPV due to social significance and high public 
effectiveness of the project. The private partner is less inclined to be interested in the project if it 
promises a profit sufficient only to recoup the invested funds. 
Moreover, financial capital structure matters for the private partner in decision making 
about PPP project realization. 
Yescombe (2007) divides the Project IRR and the Equity IRR. The first one is calculated 
for the cash ﬂow before debt service or equity returns. This indicator is accounted for purpose of 
evaluation of the project economic viability without taking into consideration its ﬁnancial 
structure. 
However, the more important indicator is the Equity IRR showing the equity cash ﬂow 
(distributions) in comparison with the original equity investment. This is a widely applied core 
rate for making investment decisions to figure out a profitable investment projects requirements. 
According to the Russian PPP normative regulation, Public Effectiveness assessment is 
interpreted as evaluation of the Social-Economic Impact. 
Financial Effectiveness for the Russian public partner is evaluated on the base of the 
Financial Attractiveness and the Comparative Advantage calculation. This assessment methods 
is regulated by the same act as those for Socio-Economic Impact measurement, in particular, by 
the methodology 11.30.2015 N 894 “On Approval of the Methodology for Evaluating the 
Efficiency of the Public-Private Partnership Project, the Municipal-Private Partnership Project 
and Determining their Comparative Advantage”. 
The financial performance is considered to be sufficient for the project initiation if the 
Net Present Value indicator is positive or equal to zero providing that weight average cost of 
capital is equal or 2,5% more than Federal loan bonds rate. 
Socio-Economic Impact of the project is computed taking into account the goals and 
objectives defined in Federal target programs and relevant documents of strategic planning. 
If the evaluation of the project found to be effective for each of these criteria, the next 
step is Comparative Advantage calculation. 
PPP project has the Comparative Advantage if, firstly, the net discounted costs of the 
budgets of the Russian Federation budgetary system providing PPP project implementation are 
less than the net present costs at realization of the Public or Municipal contract
3
. Secondly, the 
amount of liabilities taken by the public partner in case of appearing of the PPP project’s risk 
                                                          
3
 Because of this term, PPP and MPP projects’ realization in Russia is hard to launch. Usually, costs on PPP and 
MPP exceed expenditures on Public and Municipal Contracts. However, the Federal Law on Concession № 115 
does not include this condition and Concession Projects are implemented widely in the Russian regions. Moreover, 
PPP projects could be more expensive because of explicating risks which private investors can account in the price 
of their services (Makovšek 2013).  
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events should be less than those in case of Public or Municipal contract implementation. 
However, the last requirement is less likely to satisfy with because usually costs of public 
procurement are smaller than those of PPP project realization. 
 A positive conclusion of the authorized body does not guarantee the project launch. The 
final decision is in jurisdiction of the supreme executive body of the respective level. The same 
time, a negative conclusion of the authorized body is not a prohibition to finalize the draft and 
make an additional attempt to get approve.  
In order to be regarded financially and economically successful the project should 
comply with all three conditions described above. If the project answers all requirements this is 
directed to the supreme executive body for final decision.  
If the final decision on project realization is positive, public partner in a period not 
exceeding 180 days from the date of decision making provides the organization and conduct of 
the competition among potential investors for the right to make a deal.  
To sum up, the methods described above are devoted to enabling tolls for measurement of 
the success of the separate projects. However, the Master Thesis’s scope is the regional and it is 
necessary to figure out whether there are methods of PPP success estimation for the separate 
regions. 
There are assessment methods from the aspect of the level of PPP development in certain 
areas. The National Rating of the Level of PPP Development in the Regions of Russia presents 
the results of the application of PPP mechanisms for the development of the Russian 
infrastructure in a generalized form, provides key statistical indicators of the activities of the 
subjects of the Russian Federation in the development of the PPP sphere, and identifies the main 
trends’ characteristic for the market of Public-Private Partnership projects in the regions. Thus, 
this methodology appraises the regional executive bodies’ efforts on developing PPP 
mechanisms. In turn, it enables assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of PPP 
development mechanisms in the regions and creates analysis base for the PPP development 
strategy improvement, concentrating on those areas where it is necessary to do (Association 
“PPP Development Center” 2016). 
The National Rating of the Investment Climate in Russian regions is very indirect tools to 
evaluate the perspectives of executive bodies’ efforts on improvement investment climate (The 
Agency of Strategic Initiatives 2014a). The rating reveals investment attractiveness of the 
regions on the base of key investment determinants, including PPP Critical Success Factors (The 
Agency of Strategic Initiatives 2014b).  
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The Regional Rating Evaluation techniques described above reflect the Territorial Focus 
to decision making about participation in PPP. This approach presumes that participators choose 
firstly location and then they will have a choice of a potential project in chosen region.  
However, when the problem is to choose not the PPP region but the project to join in, 
there are many techniques as well. These evaluation methods are concentrated on the project 
characteristics and cover regional specifics briefly as an additional component of assessment of a 
potential project versus existing alternative projects.  
To sum up, there are two main directions of PPP evaluation approaches. According to the 
first one, PPP evaluation schemes vary relatively to the evaluation level (choosing a region for 
PPP launch or selection on the project level). The second one categorizes assessment techniques 
respectively to the target focus of assessment which varies according to the partner’s assessment 
priorities. 
Table 4 synthesizes the results of studying PPP success evaluation approaches. 
Table 4 - PPP success evaluation approaches 
Classification 
criteria 
Classification Success measure Methods 
Focus of PPP 
effectiveness 
evaluation  
Focus of PPP 
success 
evaluation is 
PPP Public 
Effectiveness  
 
Social 
Effectiveness 
Sociological surveys, Comparative 
Analysis of the level of population 
satisfaction before and after the project 
implementation 
Ecological 
Effectiveness 
Indexation of the accumulated data, 
Normative method, Coefficient method.  
Infrastructure  
Effectiveness 
Comparative Analysis of the availability 
of analogous infrastructure objects in more 
developed regions having similar needs to 
the region chosen 
Effectiveness of 
Innovations 
Accounting for direct and indirect effects 
from the implementation of innovations 
Budget 
Effectiveness 
Calculating the increase in revenues to the 
budget and reducing budget expenditures 
Focus of PPP 
success 
evaluation is 
Commercial 
Financial 
Attractiveness 
Costs/Benefits Analysis, Financial 
Analysis (IRR, NPV, payback period, 
break-even point, etc.), Comparative 
Advantage measurement, Value for 
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Source: made by author. 
The discussed methods could also be grouped by ex-post and ex-ante analysis. Ex-post 
analysis relies to the regional methods allowing assessing of government efforts on improvement 
conditions for PPP. Meanwhile, ex-ante analysis is used on the project level when the question is 
formulated in the following way: whether it is worthwhile of implementing a particular project. 
With regard to the purpose of this work which is to determine PPP Critical Success 
Factors boosting private sector involvement in PPP projects in the Russian regions, it is 
necessary to elaborate on methods that study success of PPPs at the regional level with focus on 
private partner’s interests. However, keeping in mind dilemma of partners’ interests discussed 
by Greve and Hodge (2015), public partner’s interests, at least, in part of public satisfaction of 
services provision should be observed. The following paragraphs discuss in details assessment 
methods which are flexible frameworks and could be applied both by public and private partners 
at the regional level. 
2.2 PPP assessment methods at the regional level  
This paragraph, firstly, summarizes general PPP assessment methods and, secondly, 
studies possibility of their application at the regional level. 
Kurniawan, Mudjanarko, and Ogunlana (2015) suggest assessment of PPP project 
success on the base of the same indicators but using a little bit different structure: Input and 
Output worksheets. The Figure 3 demonstrates their assessment scheme. 
 
 
 
Interest Money approach, Analytical Hierarchy 
System, Sensitivity Analysis, Analysis of 
inputs/outputs worksheets. 
Levels of 
evaluation 
Regional level 
of PPP success 
evaluation  
Regional PPP 
efficiency rating 
Expert interviews, Questionnaires, 
Mathematical and Statistical methods: 
Econometric Modeling, Factor Analysis 
(Oyedele 2013). 
Regional 
investment 
attractiveness 
rating 
Project level of 
PPP success 
evaluation 
Vary depending 
on purpose of 
evaluation 
All methods used by public and private 
partners (described under the first criteria) 
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Figure 3 – Input and Output worksheets’ PPP success assessment method 
 
Source: Kurniawan, Mudjanarko, and Ogunlana (2015). 
The Input worksheets implies the initial project assumptions such as exchange and 
interest rates, inflation, time limitations, required return on equity, etc. Some of the information 
is external (for example, interest rate) and could not be controlled by project performers. Using 
this method, it is possible to change numbers in the input assumptions and the project result will 
be re-counted automatically due to having same formulas.  
Output worksheets will help evaluate financial attractiveness of the project. They include 
financial documentation (balance sheets, cash flow distribution), etc. and critical performance 
indicators (net profit, NPV, returns on capital, calculated IRR). Those calculations are based on 
the principals of discounting cash flows, however, this method could give different results 
depending on calculation techniques (Oliveira and Marques 2014).  
Analytical Hierarchy Process is one of decision-making (Decision Support Systems) 
techniques proposed by Thomas L. Saaty. Decision Support System can develop a multifactor or 
multi-criteria task in the hierarchy. A hierarchy means a complex problem reflecting in a multi-
level structure. Following this logic, a complex problem can be split into groups, and then 
organized as a hierarchy so that the problem visualization is more framed and systematic. Figure 
4 demonstrates decision support system scheme. 
Figure 4 – Decision Support System in PPP success evaluation 
 
Source: Nurdiana, Wibowo, and Hatmoko (2015). 
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The authors propose using Sensitivity Analysis on the base of the Hierarchy method. 
Sensitivity analysis makes a choice of particular criteria reasonable. Modification of the criteria 
definitely leads to the priority change which is calculated by Hierarchy method. That is how 
Hierarchy method and Sensitivity Analysis relate.  The private partner can analyze priorities  
The following Figure 5 is an example of how determining of the priorities is reached by 
multiplying the weight of each criteria and the weight of each alternative decision.  
Figure 5 - Global Priority Matrix and Analytical Hierarchy Process in PPP success 
appraisal 
 
Source: Nurdiana, Wibowo, and Hatmoko (2015). 
- A, B, C - Alternative; 
-                – Criteria; 
-                – the Criteria Weight  
- X – Global Priority of Alternative A; 
- Y – Global Priority i=of Alternative B; 
- Z – Global Priority of Alternative C. 
“The changes of Weight Criterion (x1), will make the changes of priority. These changes 
of priority can be seen in the changing of global priority values (X, Y, and Z). The Weight of the 
Criteria can be changed to be smaller or larger than the previous. The same step is also 
performed on the weights x2, x3, and x4. Then it will be known the sensitivity changes from 
each criteria” (Nurdiana, Wibowo, and Hatmoko 2015, 14). 
Yuwen and Zhang (2013) propose simulation of investment returns on the toll project. 
When evaluating the project, researchers collect information and make some computations to 
forecast the variety of outcomes for the inputs made. There are four types of risks based on the 
project, costs, toll specifics and financing. Every risk characteristics incorporates evaluation of 
some critical variables. Monte Carlo method is a risk simulation tool allowing suggestion of the 
odds of these variables’ distributions. After risk simulation shows how the values can be 
distributed depending on introductory data, the following step is to optimize these values to 
achieve desired result. This step is named risk optimization. There are two directions of risk 
optimization. The first is calculating the optimal value combination to help set risk control 
benchmarks” (Yuwen and Zhang 2013, 5). The second is to control one variable’s values to 
explore “the optimal total revenue” considering pricing policy. 
Yuwen and Zhang (2013) apply risk simulation approach to predict distributions of 
investment returns for toll projects. This information is critical to the quality of financial analysis 
and managing risks. 
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According to the authors, Monte Carlo experiments’ method is more sophisticated tool in 
comparison with traditional sensitivity analysis as gives possibility to evaluate variety of 
randomly generated scenarios. Peng, Wei and Liu (2013) add that analytical information done by 
means of Monte-Carlo experiments is easily to use again changing input data. In other words, the 
process is quickly automatized. The Figure 6 reflects the risk simulation methodology steps 
(Yuwen and Zhang 2013). 
On the first step of analysis, toll project’s critical factors for financial analysis are 
defined. Next, financial indicators (NPV, IRR, ADSCR) are calculated on the base of the input 
data (values of critical variables). The following analysis is devoted to risk simulation and 
optimization described above.  
Monte-Carlo experiments is advanced statistical tool and financial analysis of cash flows 
based on IRR, NPV, etc. is self-sufficient for decision making. One of famous approaches in the 
international and Russian practice is to measure financial attractiveness of the PPP project is to 
assess generated cash flows (World Bank 2012; OECD 2016, Makarov 2014). 
Figure 6 – Risk Simulation methodology. Monte-Carlo method 
 
Source: Yuwen and Zhang (2013). 
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As it follows from the more elaborate studying of the PPP effectiveness assessment 
methods, they could specify on any quantitatively measured target indicators. However, they 
make focus on the evaluation of the project economic viability and formulate the assessment 
goal as selection of the best project among alternatives or evaluation the existing project 
perspectives.  The regional PPP effectiveness assessment methods will be explored further to 
evaluate their focus.  
The National Rating of the Investment Climate in Russian Regions 
The system of the Rating developed by representatives of leading business associations 
and experts is aimed at assessing the efforts of regional authorities to improve the investment 
climate in the region (the Agency of Strategic Initiatives 2014b; Nikitin 2016). 
The Rating consists of 54 indicators that are grouped into 19 factors. In turn, the factors 
are grouped into four areas: Regulatory Environment, Institutions for Business, Infrastructure 
and Resources, Small Business Support (the Agency of Strategic Initiatives 2014). 
The indicator Regulatory Environment characterizes the quality of the provision of public 
services for business and includes the time for the passage of standard administrative procedures, 
their number and entrepreneurs’ satisfaction. Typical procedures include: 
- registration of legal entities; 
- issuing permits for construction; 
- issuing licenses; 
- registration of property rights for real estate; 
- connection to power networks. 
The Institutions for Business indicator serves to assess the availability and effectiveness 
of institutions for protecting and improving the investment environment. It includes indicators 
such as: 
- availability and quality of regional legislation on mechanisms for protecting investors’ 
rights and supporting investment activities; 
- effectiveness of the institution of assessment of regulatory impact in the subject of the 
Russian Federation. 
The indicator Infrastructure and Resources is characterized by: 
- level of development of physical, investment and social-labor infrastructure; 
- availability of resources for business and investment activities. 
The indicator Support for Small Business is measured by: 
- the number of small businesses per 1,000 people in the region; 
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- effectiveness of various types of support, such as the evaluation of procedures for 
obtaining consultative and educational services provided by organizations of small business 
support infrastructure in the region; 
- assessment of the real estate necessary for business; 
- an assessment of the availability of credit resources, etc. (Nikitin 2016). 
Data collection and calculation of indicators’ values 
The Rating uses three types of indicators: questioning, expert and statistical. Data was 
transferred from natural units to a single scale from 0 to 100 using proportional linear scaling (0 
corresponds to the worst possible result, and 100 corresponds to the best possible result). 
The values of factors and direction indices were calculated as a weighted average for the 
standardized values of the indicators. Weights were determined by experts. 
 The breakdown into groups was carried out using the method of the largest gaps, the 
boundaries of the groups were determined in the places of the greatest difference in the values of 
the indicator between the neighboring regions, the results of pilot testing of the national rating of 
the investment climate in the subjects of the Russian Federation (The Agency of Strategic 
Initiatives 2014).  
The Rating of the Russian Regions on the Public-Private Partnership Development Level 
The methodology used to assess the level of Public-Private Partnership development  
corresponds to the methodology approved by the Order of the Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation of May 15, 2014 No. 266. In the framework of the study, 
the authors attracted a wide range of experts and infrastructure market participants whose 
estimates were used in the calculation Indicators related to the experience of implementing 
Public-Private Partnership projects and the quality of the institutional environment for the 
implementation of such projects. 
The calculation of the complex indicator the Level of Development of the Sphere of 
Public-Private Partnership in the subject of the Russian Federation is made by the following 
formula: 
                 , 
j - serial number of the subject of the Russian Federation; 
α, β, γ - weights that determine the significance of the composite factors, with α = 0.4, β 
= 0.3, γ = 0.3; 
    - the factor “Development of the institutional environment in the sphere of Public-
Private Partnership”; 
   - the factor “Experience in implementing Public-Private Partnership projects”; 
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   - the factor “Investment attractiveness for the subject of the Russian Federation”. 
Computation of the composite factors’ weights 
The factor “Development of the institutional environment” in the sphere of Public-Private 
Partnership has the greatest weight, because at the moment Public-Private Partnership in the 
Russian Federation is at the stage of formation and the development of the institutional 
environment is the most important component for attracting investments in the development of 
public infrastructure using PPP mechanisms according to the authors. The rest two factors have 
the equal weights calculated as (1 - 0.4) / 2 = 0.3 
Such weights’ prioritizing confirms this paper approach to the classification of PPP 
effectiveness assessment methods in part of grouping methods by their focus – when making 
some assessment frameworks researches rank some circumstances by their importance. 
Intermediate indicators constituting the composite factors  
Development of the Institutional Environment consists of the following indicators: 
- regional PPP Law; 
- regional normative legal acts in the sphere of PPP; 
- municipal legal acts in the field of MPP; 
- NRAs regulating the application of various PPP models; 
- investment development program (investment strategies); 
-  PPP development plan and (or) PPP implementation program in the subject of the 
Russian Federation; 
- the investment fund of the subject of the Russian Federation. 
Experience in Implementing Public-Private Partnership projects accumulates: 
- the current status of the project (implementation phase); 
- the volume of the financial resources invested by a private investor; 
- the period of the project implementation taking into account all stages; 
- sectoral differentiation of projects in the subject; 
- the expert coefficient. 
Investment Attractiveness for the Subject of the Russian Federation is based on the rating 
of the investment attractiveness of the regions of Russia by the rating agency Expert RA. The 
factor has a value, expressed in points, which was exposed on the basis of the investment 
attractiveness rating of each subject. 
Summarizing PPP success evaluation methods it is necessary to make a conclusion about 
possibility to evaluate PPP success for the private partner as well as for the public partner at the 
regional level in terms of the Master thesis objectives. 
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Those methods that are oriented to both public and private partners are presented at the 
project level (the goal of the analysis is to choose from existing alternatives), and not at the 
regional level. In particular, there is a lack of business-focused methods at the regional level. 
No doubt, there are PPP assessment instruments concerning regional approach. The most 
sophisticated Russian methods in this area are two of the Public-Private Partnership center and 
the Agency of Strategic Initiatives described in this Chapter. Although, these methods are mainly 
designed for public management’s purposes and target executive bodies as a main user. Of 
course, they include evaluation of the indicators which the private partner is interested in but 
there many other indicators as government regulatory impact assessment and such indicators 
may significantly change values of the whole composite factor. As one more example in favor of 
government-oriented approach of these methods, assessment of the business environment is 
carried out from the perspective of qualitative implantation in the regions of the Regional 
Investment Standard (The Agency of Strategic Initiatives 2014a). Basically, these regional 
techniques are dedicated to effectiveness of the executive bodies’ activities on improving PPP 
and investment climate development in the regions. 
Taking into account these facts, the research gap is in providing a methodology allowing 
evaluation business perception of how PPP develops in the Russian regions. There are sufficient 
methods to evaluate government efforts on PPP development in the regions but not to know how 
the business evaluates their efforts. The drawback of existing regional methods is in the lack of 
“customization”. 
Client-oriented methodology should aim assessment of the PPP Critical Success Factors 
from the position of investors and detect which factors matter for the private partner in decision-
making. Some of these factors were defined in the Chapter 1 in review of the researches devoted 
to the identification of such factors. The following Chapter presents an analysis of connection 
between the identified Critical Success Factors and the private partner readiness to participate in 
the provision of public services to observe determined Critical Success Factors’ relevance to the 
Russian regional specific. The research devoted to evaluation of PPP CSFs in regions from the 
business perception can spread more light to the government on how the business perceives the 
PPP supporting environment. This research does not claim to be a self-dependent methodology 
but could be a helpful addition to the existing methods. 
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2.3 Research methodology 
This paragraph is devoted to the paper research framework. There is explanation how the 
datum has been collected, research method and its limitations.  
The data-base for this research has been taken from the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) held by European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development in partnership with the World Bank (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 2014a). This survey is aimed at studying the quality of the business environment in 
countries and regions. 
For the purpose of writing the Master’s thesis, survey data were obtained for 37 regions 
of the Russian Federation for 2012, as this period is characterized by a rise in PPP activity in the 
regions of the Russian Federation.  
Companies from the following industries were eliminated from the initial BEEPS sample 
as least relevant to PPP: food, tobacco products, textiles, garments, tanning & leather, wood, 
paper & paper products, publishing-printing and recorded media, coke & refined petroleum, 
furniture, wholesale, retail, hotel and restaurants. 
The Figure 1 and Figure 2 in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively show the structure 
of the sample presented by sector and region. Red color shows the share of respondents in each 
industry (region) that participate in the provision of public services; green represents those who 
do not participate in the provision of public services and in there is the percentage of respondents 
who did not indicate their position relative to the provision of public services was allocated in 
blue. 
Most respondents, up to about 70% in each industry, participate in the provision of public 
services. The Appendix 3 presents in more detail the structure of answers about involvement in 
the provision of public services in the most relevant industries (transport, construction, etc). 
Turning to the Appendix 2 showing the regional structure of the respondents, in most of 
the involved regions, the majority of respondents are involved in the provision of public services.  
The regions were divided into 4 groups according to the "PPP start" rating (Association 
“PPP Development Center” 2013), reflecting the level of development of PPPs in the regions at 
the time of the survey by the World Bank. Regions constituting the sample were ranked in 
ascending order according to the rank assigned to the region by “PPP start”. The border between 
the groups passed after every ninth region, because, basically, following the rating, the regions 
went in order, and there were no big gaps between the positions.  
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Cluster 1 
Saint Petersburg            1 
Republic of Tatarstan            2 
Voronezh Region    3 
Yaroslavl Region 4 
Belgorod Region           6 
Nizhni Novgorod Region            7
Kaluga Region             9 
Novosibirsk Region            10 
Rostov Region            11 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Sverdlovsk Region            12 
Moscow City            13 
Krasnoyarsk Territory            14 
Krasnodar Territory            15 
Kirov Region             16 
Ulyanovsk Region            17 
Leningrad Region            18 
Lipetsk Region            20 
Moscow Region            21 
  
  
Cluster 3 
Omsk Region            23 
Samara Region            25 
Irkutsk Region            28 
Volgograd Region     30 
Tomsk Region            31 
Stavropol Territory  35 
 Kemerovo Region          38 
Kursk Region            42 
Murmansk Region            43 
 
Cluster 4 
 
Tver Region            45 
Chelyabinsk Region            46 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)            47
Smolensk Region            49 
Republic of Bashkortostan            51
Perm Territory            56 
Kaliningrad Region          62 
Khabarovsk Territory            64 
Republic of Mordovia            72 
Primorsky Territory            81 
  
Thus, the first three clusters include 9 regions, and 4, which represent the regions with the 
least favorable conditions for PPP combines 10 regions. 
Figure 7 shows the number and involvement of respondents in the provision of public 
services in each cluster.     
Figure 7 – Respondents’ involvement in provision of public services by clusters 
 
The number -9 means that there was no answer to the question about participation in the 
provision of public services by the respondent company. Number 1 coded the answers of 
respondents who responded positively to this question and number 2 characterizes negative 
answers. 
     Total          78        797        151       1,026 
                                                        
         4          21        196         43         260 
         3          28        177         48         253 
         2           8        231         22         261 
         1          21        193         38         252 
                                                        
   cluster          -9          1          2       Total
              provision of public services 
             Private business involvement in
. tab cluster veb3
39 
 
The first cluster consists of 252 respondents, of which 193 are involved in providing 
public services. The second cluster consists of 261 respondents, of which 231 are involved in the 
provision of public services. The total number of respondents in 3 cluster is 253 people, of which 
177 people have experience in providing public services. The last, the fourth cluster, has 260 
people, of which 196 people participate or participated in the provision of public services. 
The meaning of the status of participation in the provision of public services should be 
determined. A positive answer implies that the respondent company participated or is currently 
involved in the provision of public services, in other words, has such kind of experience. For 
brevity, the work will further mention that the respondents are involved. 
In order to answer the main research question, in particular, whether there is interrelation 
between investors’ attitude to the level of PPP Critical Success Factors’ development in the 
region and their involvement in the provision of public services there. The initial research 
hypothesis is that investors who participate in the provision of public services evaluate PPP 
Critical Success Factors’ development more positively than not participating investors estimate. 
Table of contingency is a convenient format of presenting descriptive statistics and Chi-
square test is applicable for detection whether there is statistically significant interrelation 
between respondents’ Involvement Status and PPP Critical Success Factors’ estimation level 
(Williams 2017). 
Chi-square test (Pearson test) is a technique enabling identification of the existing 
association between two categorical variables. The null hypothesis is formulated as there is no 
association between observed categories or, in other words, these variables are interdependent 
toward to each other. If the p-value is higher than 0,05 with confidence level equal to 0,95, the 
null hypotheses is not rejected.  
“Chi-Square Test is based on    distribution with (r - 1) and (c - 1) degrees of freedom 
and that    =    , when degrees of freedom=1 (2x2 table)” (Scott and Peeples 2017). 
   ∑
       
 
  
  
   
 
“The chi-square test is based on quantifying whether deviations from these two expected 
numbers are serious enough to warrant rejection of the null hypothesis. In general, the chi-square 
test looks like this:    is the expected number,    is the observed number, r is the number of 
rows, and c is the number of columns. Distributed according to the chi-square distribution with 
df=(r - 1) * (c - 1) degrees of freedom” (Scott and Peeples 2017).  
The important limitation of this test application is that presence of association does not 
imply causality relationship. It means that category 1 is not obligatory influence category 2 or 
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reversely. The test informs that category 1 and category 2 are interdependent, statistically 
significant toward to each other.  
The second important limitation is that Chi-square test counts on “large sample theory” 
and could be invalid in terms of small sample size.  
The alternative test that could be carried out if the second limitation happens is a Fisher’s 
Exact test. This test calculate “precise” likelihood of data appearing in the studied dataset 
providing that no association exists. 
The studied categories are the following. The first one characterizes private business 
involvement in provision of public services. There are three options to establish respondents’ 
positions such as “Yes”, “No” and “No reply”. The second category describes respondents’ 
evaluation of PPP risks connected to the Critical Success Factors chosen for analysis (European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2014b).  
If it is necessary to evaluate Transparency of Selection Process in PPP, the respondents’ 
answers on the question how they evaluate PPP risk of Lobbying and Non-Transparent Selection 
Process. The answers are “None”, “Moderate”, “Major” and “No reply”.  
Following the same logic, the Critical Success Factor “Financial Availability” is bound to 
the variable “PPP risk: Termination of Financingdue to lack of / lower budget revenue”, factor 
“Social Support” is to “PPP risk: people unhappy about provision of public services by private 
business”, factor “Project Feasibility” is to “PPP risk: evaluation of PPP Transparency and 
Openness”, factor “Government Support” is to “ PPP risk: Positive Changes in the Regional 
Legislation over last 2-3 years” (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2014a). 
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3. IDENTIFICATION OF FACTORS BOOSTING BUSINESS INVOLVEMENT 
INTO PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE RUSSIAN REGIONS 
3.1 Dominant PPP risks in the Russian regions according to investors’ opinion 
The beginning of the Chapter 3 is a kind of descriptive statistics. Respondents were asked 
to assess PPP Critical Success Factors through risks, as it is described in the previous paragraph 
of Chapter 2. The higher the level of risk of PPP in the respondents’ opinion is, the lower the 
level of development of the relevant factor. The tables formed in the current paragraph make it 
possible to see how positively / negatively investors evaluate these or other risks in all clusters. 
Figure 8 – Evaluation of PPP risk: Termination of Financing due to lack of / lower 
budget revenue, all clusters (%) 
 
The majority of respondents in all clusters consider the risk of Termination of Financing 
to be major. Interesting tendency is that the worse PPP level development in the cluster, the more 
proportion of respondents there who state the absence of this risk. Taking into account the fact, 
that majority of respondents in each cluster are business representatives participating in 
provision of public services, it could be the following explanation of increasing “None” 
evaluation proportion in clusters: in clusters with lower PPP development rating investors are 
likely to participate in PPP if they think of risks as not very serious obstacles.  
Figure 9 – Evaluation of PPP risk: Lobbying and Non-Transparent Selection Process, all 
clusters (%) 
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As for respondents’ attitude to the risk of Lobbying and Non-Transparent Selection 
Process, the major risk estimation prevails in all regions but in less proportion than it is presented 
on the Figure 9 describing assessment of the “Termination of financing” risk. In the rest, the 
tendency for respondents to change their opinions on the transition from a cluster with a higher 
level of PPP development to clusters with a lower level, described in the study of the risk of 
Lobbying, persists. It can be assumed that when assessing the relationship between business 
involvement in the provision of public services and their risk assessment, results by financial and 
Lobbying risks will coincide in the same clusters. 
Figure 10 – Positive changes in regional legislation over last 2-3 years, all clusters (%) 
 
The least share of respondents (in comparison with the rest clusters) who are inclined to 
believe that changes in regional legislation influencing positively the development of PPPs have 
occurred is in cluster 4. Moreover, the highest share of respondents who tend to reject Positive 
Changes in Legislation is in cluster 4 as well, to compare with the answers in the other clusters. 
In addition, observing the distribution of answers’ proportion within cluster 4, 67% of 
respondents believe that there is no any Positive Changes in the Regional Legislation toward to 
PPP development. Basically, this Figure 10 goes alongside with PPP Rating which ranks lower 
the regions constituting cluster 4, in comparison with how it rates conditions of PPP 
development in regions forming the other clusters.  
Figure 11 – PPP risk: Social Dissatisfaction of business involvement, all clusters (%)
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Studying the respondents’ perception of how society appraises the quality of public 
services provided by business, the whole picture is more positive. The moderate risk level 
dominates in all clusters. The proportion of respondents who believe that there is no risk of 
Social Dissatisfaction at all is higher in clusters 2, 3 and 4 almost two times than it is in cluster 1 
which is most PPP-developed cluster.  
Figure 12 – PPP risk: People unhappy about public services provided by private 
business, all clusters (%) 
 
There is very low frequency of answers from respondents who trust in absolute openness 
and transparency of PPP process of project realization in the regions of Russia. More positive 
respondents are in cluster 3 with regard to their answers.  
To conclude, there are very few answers that risks are “None” speaking about all 
observed risks. This shows that the level of PPP CSFs development needs to be improved in 
opinion of respondents to satisfy their expectations. Social Support is evaluated more positively 
than Government Support. 
3.2 Interconnection between business involvement in provision of public services 
and how business evaluates PPP conditions in the Russian regions  
The previous paragraph summarizes results of how respondents assess development of 
PPP Critical Success Factors in the Russian regions (Success factors were suggested to be 
evaluated through relevant PPP risks. The higher the estimated level of risk is the worse the level 
of development of the relevant factor).  
In this part, it is essential to find out whether there is a statistical relationship between the 
willingness of business to participate in the provision of public services and the way business 
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assesses the development of critical factors for the success of PPPs in the region. The willingness 
to participate means the business Involvement Status of the respondent, namely, whether a 
respondent participates / participated in the provision of public services or does not participate / 
did not participate. Identification of the relationship between investors’ evaluation of PPP CSFs 
and their Involvement Status will help to determine the conditions for the development of PPPs 
in regions whose improvement is important for attracting business. 
The data presented on the figures is relative by rows. Thus, we can estimate what the 
level of risk evaluation is most widespread among those who participate and who do not 
participate in provision of public services. Information on how the relationship between the risk 
assessment and the fact of participation / non-participation is statistically detected is provided in 
the section “Research methodology”. This analytical part presents results’ interpretation. The 
categories “No answer”, “None”, “Moderate” and “Major” are presented under the numbers -9, 
1, 2 and 3 respectively horizontally on the figures. The categories verifying business 
Involvement Status are “No answer”, “Yes” and “No” are under the numbers -9, 1, 2 vertically.  
Analysis of the Critical Success Factor “Financing availability” 
Figure 13 - PPP risk: Termination of Financingdue to lack of / lower budget revenue and 
involvement, cluster 1 (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Fisher's exact =                 0.558
          Pearson chi2(6) =   4.7016   Pr = 0.583
     Total       14.68       9.13      30.95      45.24      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       15.79       2.63      34.21      47.37      100.00 
         1       13.47      10.36      31.61      44.56      100.00 
        -9       23.81       9.52      19.05      47.62      100.00 
                                                                   
 services           -9          1          2          3       Total
 of public          lack of/lower budget revenue
 provision    PPP risk: Termination of financing due to
      t in  
involvemen  
  business  
   Private  
45 
 
Figure 14 - PPP risk: Termination of Financingdue to lack of / lower budget revenue and 
involvement, cluster 2 (%) 
 
Figure 15 - PPP risk: Termination of Financingdue to lack of / lower budget revenue and 
involvement, cluster 3 (%) 
 
Figure 16 - PPP risk: Termination of Financingdue to lack of / lower budget revenue and 
involvement, cluster 4 (%) 
In cluster 1 there is no statistical relationship between the status of respondents’ involvement in 
the provision of public services and their perception of the risk of Termination of Financing due 
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to lower / lack of budget revenue. Among those who participate in the provision of public 
services in cluster 1, 10% believe that the risk of Termination of Financing due to lower / lack of 
budget revenue does not exist at all, and 45% of the respondents feel it is major. Of those who do 
not participate, only 3% believe that there is no such risk, and there is approximately the same 
share of opinions (among 47%) who do not take part in the high risk assessment compared to the 
participants. In general, the opinions of the participants and non-participants are evenly 
distributed when evaluating the financial risk as an average: 32% of the responses of participants 
and 35% of those of non-participants. 
The analysis of the relationship between assessment of the risk of Termination of 
Financing and involvement in the provision of public services in cluster 2 demonstrates a similar 
situation to how it is going in cluster 1. Estimates of the level of this risk and the status of 
participation are not dependent on each other statistically. At the same time, 12% of participants 
believe that there is no risk of termination of financing, 29% participants consider this risk as 
moderate and 46% of them evaluate it as major. The proportion of not participating respondents 
noted the absence of this risk is similar to the participators’ proportion (14% versus 12% 
respectively). About 30% of the participants and 14% of non-participants rate this risk as 
moderate. A major assessment of this risk was set by 45% of the participants and 50% of non-
participants that is also not a big difference. Thus, as in cluster 1, there are no differences in the 
behavior of participating and non-participating respondents: the risk levels mostly are estimated 
in similar proportions. 
When studying cluster 3, the interrelation between the assessment level of the risk of 
Termination of Financing and participation in the provision of public services is detected. 
Participating and not participating in a similar proportion estimate the absence of such financial 
risk: 12% of participants and 15% of non-participants believe that this risk is absent. It is 
interesting that almost half of the participating respondents (45%) evaluate the risk of 
Termination of Financing as major. The major level was assigned as well by not participating 
respondents in a smaller proportion (35%). Considering that in this cluster the respondents’ 
assessment of the risks is statistically associated with their Involvement Status, it can be assumed 
that this factor is significant, but does not affect the decision to participate in this cluster. 
Participating respondents are consciously assuming the risks of financing. 
Cluster 4 also confirms the existence of association between respondents’ answers about 
participation and their perception of the risk of financing. According to the descriptive statistics, 
23% of the participants (which is significantly more than in other clusters) assessed this financial 
risk as absent versus 14% of those who do not participate. The other estimation level in both 
groups range from 30% to 38%. 
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Analysis of the Critical Success Factor “Transparency of selection process 
Figure 17 - PPP risk: Lobbying, Non-Transparent Selection Process and involvement, 
cluster 1 (%) 
 
Figure 18 - PPP risk: Lobbying, Non-Transparent Selection Process and involvement, 
cluster 2 (%) 
 
Figure 19 - PPP risk: Lobbying, Non-Transparent Selection Process and involvement, 
cluster 3 (%) 
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 provision       PPP risk: Lobbying, non-transparent
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           Fisher's exact =                 0.576
          Pearson chi2(6) =   5.5021   Pr = 0.481
     Total       14.56      10.73      28.74      45.98      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       18.18       9.09      22.73      50.00      100.00 
         1       13.42      11.26      29.87      45.45      100.00 
        -9       37.50       0.00      12.50      50.00      100.00 
                                                                   
 services    Don't kno       None   Moderate      Major       Total
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 provision       PPP risk: Lobbying, non-transparent
      t in  
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  business  
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           Fisher's exact =                 0.001
          Pearson chi2(6) =  27.2501   Pr = 0.000
     Total       17.39       8.70      35.18      38.74      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       12.50      12.50      43.75      31.25      100.00 
         1       13.56       9.04      34.46      42.94      100.00 
        -9       50.00       0.00      25.00      25.00      100.00 
                                                                   
 services    Don't kno       None   Moderate      Major       Total
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 provision       PPP risk: Lobbying, non-transparent
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  business  
   Private  
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Figure 20 - PPP risk: Lobbying, Non-Transparent Selection Process and involvement, 
cluster 4 (%) 
 
In cluster 1, the risk of dishonest tendering and Lobbying of interests is not associated 
with the fact whether the respondent participates in the provision of public services or does not. 
About 7% and 8% of the participators and non-participators respectively believe that this risk is 
not represented in their regions. A large proportion of participating respondents estimate this risk 
as moderate (41%), and a large proportion of non-participating respondents assess the risk do as 
major (45%). 
In cluster 2, risk of Lobbying and Non-Transparent Selection Process is not associated 
with the participation status as well. Among participating respondents 11% evaluate the risk as 
none and 45% participating respondents mark this risk as major. Respondents who do not 
participate in provision of public services evaluate the risk of Lobbying and Non-Transparent 
Selection Process as none and major in proportion of 9% and 50% respectively. 
When evaluating risk of Lobbying and Non-Transparent Selection Process the whole 
Figure is the same as for risk of projects’ financing termination: there is association between 
studied categories for clusters 3 and 4 versus absent association between variables for clusters 1 
and 2.  
Speaking about cluster 3, 9% of participating respondents labeled Lobbying risk as none 
and 13% of not participating respondents did in the same way. The focus of risk power is 
switched to the major mark (43%) among participating respondents and, oppositely, to the left 
side toward to the moderate mark (44%) for not participating respondents. 
In cluster 4, the relation between perception of Lobbying and Non-Transparent selection 
risk and participation status follows the tendency described in the previous cluster toward this 
risk. About 14% of participating respondents suppose that there is no such a risk, 36% and 44% 
of them consider the risk to be moderate and major respectively. As for not participating 
           Fisher's exact =                 0.000
          Pearson chi2(6) =  33.9566   Pr = 0.000
     Total       13.08      13.46      33.46      40.00      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       23.26      16.28      32.56      27.91      100.00 
         1        7.14      13.27      35.71      43.88      100.00 
        -9       47.62       9.52      14.29      28.57      100.00 
                                                                   
 services    Don't kno       None   Moderate      Major       Total
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respondents, 16% of them suggest that the risk of Lobbying and Non-Transparent Selection 
Process is none, 33% characterize it as moderate and 28% evaluate as major.  
Evaluation of the Critical Success Factor: Social Support 
Figure 21 - PPP risk: Social Dissatisfaction and business involvement, cluster 1 (%) 
 
Figure 22 - PPP risk: Social Dissatisfaction and business involvement, cluster 2 (%) 
 Figure 23 - PPP risk: Social Dissatisfaction and business involvement, cluster 3 (%) 
 
           Fisher's exact =                 0.461
          Pearson chi2(6) =   6.1485   Pr = 0.407
     Total       14.68      10.32      53.17      21.83      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       13.16       7.89      44.74      34.21      100.00 
         1       13.99      11.40      54.92      19.69      100.00 
        -9       23.81       4.76      52.38      19.05      100.00 
                                                                   
 services    Don't kno       None   Moderate      Major       Total
 of public      services provided by private business
 provision      PPP risk: People unhappy about public
      t in  
involvemen  
  business  
   Private  
           Fisher's exact =                 0.011
          Pearson chi2(6) =  16.4106   Pr = 0.012
     Total        9.96      19.92      42.53      27.59      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       18.18       9.09      27.27      45.45      100.00 
         1        8.23      21.21      45.02      25.54      100.00 
        -9       37.50      12.50      12.50      37.50      100.00 
                                                                   
 services    Don't kno       None   Moderate      Major       Total
 of public      services provided by private business
 provision      PPP risk: People unhappy about public
      t in  
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   Private  
           Fisher's exact =                 0.000
          Pearson chi2(6) =  39.5475   Pr = 0.000
     Total       16.21      18.97      44.27      20.55      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       14.58      27.08      43.75      14.58      100.00 
         1       10.73      19.77      48.02      21.47      100.00 
        -9       53.57       0.00      21.43      25.00      100.00 
                                                                   
 services    Don't kno       None   Moderate      Major       Total
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Figure 24 - PPP risk: Social Dissatisfaction and business involvement, cluster 4 (%)
 
Respondents were to answer the question what is the risk of the situation when people are 
unhappy about quality of the public services provided by private business. In cluster 1, tests 
show that there is no association between Involvement Status and attitude to the risk of Social 
Dissatisfaction. Descriptive statistics also does not provide with any logic to suggest that 
participators and non-participators differ in their perception of Social Dissatisfaction risk: 11% 
of participating respondents evaluate the risk as none versus 8% of not participating respondents. 
The majority of respondents among participating respondents as well as among not participating 
respondents estimate the risk of Social Dissatisfaction with provision public services by business 
as moderate.  
Switching to cluster 2, the picture is opposite. Respondents who participate in provision 
of public services differ from those who do not participate in their evaluation of the levels of the 
Social Dissatisfaction risk. As for participating respondents, 21% are sure that there is no risk of 
Social Dissatisfaction in their places and only 9% among not participating respondents have the 
same opinion. Observing the distribution of the risk levels’ evaluation proportions, almost half of 
the participating respondents (45%) appraise this risk as moderate. Meanwhile, almost same 
proportion of not participating respondents (46%) evaluates this risk as major. Such a 
distribution of “None” labels verifies the initial research hypothesis about private sectors’ 
behavior for cluster 2: business representatives who participate in provision of public services 
assign the lower point to the risk appraisal level than those who do not participate do.  
In cluster 3, there is statistically important association between participation and risk 
evaluation and 20% of participating respondents estimate the risk of Social Dissatisfaction as 
none. Interestingly, 27% respondents in cluster 3 give the same evaluation level. The likely 
estimation of risk absence was given in cluster 3 when evaluating of transparency of the 
partner’s selection process. The majority of participating and not participating respondents states 
that social risk is moderate (48% and 44% respectively). However, the higher share of 
           Fisher's exact =                 0.004
          Pearson chi2(6) =  21.4288   Pr = 0.002
     Total       12.31      18.46      45.00      24.23      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       20.93      13.95      37.21      27.91      100.00 
         1        7.65      19.39      48.47      24.49      100.00 
        -9       38.10      19.05      28.57      14.29      100.00 
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participating respondents (22% versus 15% who are not participating) answered that this risk is 
major. Probably, in cluster 3 when evaluating social factor, non-participators underestimate risk 
as it is observed for cluster 4 when evaluating partner’s selection process.   
In cluster 4, there is also statistically significant difference how participators and non-
participators perceive social risk. As in most of cases, participating respondents assess more 
frequently the risk as none than not participating respondents (20% versus 14%). Almost half of 
participating respondents (48%) set the moderate value to this risk. To compare, 37% of not 
participating respondents think the same.  
This behavior can be base for defining Social Support as a Critical Success Factor which 
matters in decision making about participation in provision of public services by business. It is 
not appropriate to tell about causality in terms of applied statistical methods, so that the result 
cannot be interpreted in the way: social opinion influences the investor’s decision to participate 
or, reversely, participation experience changes the respondents’ opinion. However, it is 
statistically adequate to claim that Social Support is a Critical Success Factor meaningful at 
decision making process, because there is discrepancy between participators and non-
participators in how they rank the risk of Social Dissatisfaction, in other words, this factor 
matters for them.  
Analysis of the Critical Success Factor “Project Feasibility” 
Figure 25 – Evaluation of PPP Transparency and Openness and Involvement, cluster 1 (%)
           Fisher's exact =                 0.011
          Pearson chi2(6) =  17.7262   Pr = 0.007
     Total       16.27       0.79      48.81      34.13      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       26.32       0.00      42.11      31.58      100.00 
         1       11.40       1.04      51.30      36.27      100.00 
        -9       42.86       0.00      38.10      19.05      100.00 
                                                                   
 services           -9          1          2          3       Total
 of public             and genuine competition
 provision   Evaluation of PPPs - transparency, openness
      t in  
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Figure 26 – Evaluation of PPP Transparency and Openness and Involvement, cluster 2 (%)
 
Figure 27 – Evaluation of PPP Transparency and Openness and Involvement, cluster 3 (%)
 
Figure 28 – Evaluation of PPP transparency, openness and involvement, cluster 4 (%)
 
In cluster 1, there is association between attitude to the quality of the whole process of 
provision public services (factors constituting quality are fully described in research 
methodology paragraph) and participation status. Only 1% of respondents suppose that in 
general, the whole process of realization public services is opened, transparent and competition 
is genuine. There is no any respondent in cluster 1 who would not participate and assess this risk 
           Fisher's exact =                 0.019
          Pearson chi2(6) =  19.0556   Pr = 0.004
     Total       14.56       1.53      38.31      45.59      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       13.64       0.00      22.73      63.64      100.00 
         1       12.99       1.73      40.26      45.02      100.00 
        -9       62.50       0.00      25.00      12.50      100.00 
                                                                   
 services           -9          1          2          3       Total
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 provision   Evaluation of PPPs - transparency, openness
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           Fisher's exact =                 0.000
          Pearson chi2(6) =  25.5656   Pr = 0.000
     Total       20.55       5.93      47.04      26.48      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       29.17       2.08      39.58      29.17      100.00 
         1       13.56       6.78      50.85      28.81      100.00 
        -9       50.00       7.14      35.71       7.14      100.00 
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           Fisher's exact =                 0.001
          Pearson chi2(6) =  24.9983   Pr = 0.000
     Total       18.46       3.46      39.62      38.46      100.00 
                                                                   
         2       23.26       6.98      25.58      44.19      100.00 
         1       13.78       3.06      43.37      39.80      100.00 
        -9       52.38       0.00      33.33      14.29      100.00 
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as none. Meanwhile, half of participating respondents (51%) believe that risks associated with 
contract feasibility, public partner’s policy and quality of competition are moderate. As for not 
participating respondents, 42% trust in the same level of risks and quite significant part of not 
participating respondents (26%) do not know how to evaluate these risks. 
In cluster 2, the statistical interconnection of observed categories is proved as well. 
Proportion of “None” risk level is 2% among participants and again there is no respondent who 
would appraisal risk absence and would not participate the same time. As for participators, 
respondents’ opinions are divided between moderate and major risk levels almost equally (40% 
and 45% respectively). The highest share of not participating respondents (64%) estimates this 
risk as major.  
Respondents’ behavior in cluster 3 toward the whole evaluation of PPP strongly supports 
the research logic. Participators and non-participators differ in their estimation and participators 
estimate risks not so strictly in comparison with how non-participators do. It is worthwhile to 
notice, that cluster 3 is characterized by higher share of participating respondents who evaluate 
this risk as none than it is in the other clusters (7% of participants answered “None” versus 2% 
of non-participators thinking same). Half of participating respondents believe that the risk of bad 
quality of the project briefing, clearness of the contract terms and other drawbacks destroying 
PPP project Transparency and Openness is moderate (50%). Only 40% of non-participators 
suppose same and 30% of non-participators are not able to make an evaluation.  
In cluster 4, participators and non-participators statistically differ in how they estimate 
PPP Openness, public partner’s policy clearness and transparency. The estimation of the risk as 
none is up to 3% among participators and 7% among non-participators. However, most part of 
non-participators believes that this risk is major (44%). Speaking about participators, the 
estimation focus of the risk is switched to the moderate level (43% of participators answered that 
the risk is moderate versus 26% of non-participators answered same). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Analysis of the Critical Success Factor “Government Support” 
Figure 29 – Evaluation of the regional legislation and involvement, cluster 1 (%)
 
Figure 30 – Evaluation of the regional legislation and involvement, cluster 2 (%)
 
Figure 31 – Evaluation of the regional legislation and involvement, cluster 3 (%)
 
 
 
 
 
           Fisher's exact =                 0.114
          Pearson chi2(4) =   7.2189   Pr = 0.125
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           Fisher's exact =                 0.001
          Pearson chi2(4) =  19.3546   Pr = 0.001
     Total       17.00      31.23      51.78      100.00 
                                                        
         2       18.75      27.08      54.17      100.00 
         1       12.43      31.64      55.93      100.00 
        -9       42.86      35.71      21.43      100.00 
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 of public                years
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Figure 32 – Evaluation of the regional legislation and involvement, cluster 4 (%) 
 
PPP pioneer, cluster 1, demonstrates that there is no statistically significant difference 
between participation status of respondents and their opinion about positive changes in regional 
legislation over last 2-3 years. The share of participating respondents who agree that positive 
changes occurred (24%) is almost the same as proportion of not participating respondents having 
the same opinion (21%). Regional legislation in cluster 1 is characterized by relatively high level 
of PPP regional legislation and the other regulative acts supporting PPP indirectly that can 
explain respondents’ indifference concerning their participation status to the positive legislation 
changes in cluster 1. 
Although Chi-square test result and Exact test result are controversial, it is lawfully to 
make a conclusion that there is a statistical connection between participation status and 
evaluation of the legislation changes in cluster 2. Such statement is made in favor of Chi-square 
test result because the sample size of cluster 2 complies with size limitation requirements needed 
for Chi-square test. Thus, there is no necessity to pay attention to Exact test statistics. 
The proportion of participating respondents who believe in presence of positive 
legislation versus the proportion of not participating respondents with the same point of view is 
36% to 23% respectively. As it is shown on the Figure 30, those respondents who participate 
answered more frequently that regional legislation has been upgraded than non-participators do. 
Besides, 68% of not participating respondents did not find any possible changes in the regional 
legislation boosting PPP development. 
Cluster 3 reveals similar tendency but the answers of both categories of respondents are 
more balanced toward to each other than it is in cluster 2. First of all, participators and non-
participators statistically differ in their opinion whether legislation improvement happened or did 
not. However, if turning to the descriptive statistics, this difference is not very high in 
percentage: 32% of participators and 27% of non-participators agree that the regional legislation 
has been improved.  
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In cluster 4, there is statistically significant association between Involvement Status and 
respondents’ perception of legislation changes. Moreover, there is huge contrast between 
opinions of participating and not participating respondents: 19% of participating respondents 
believe that Positive Changes in Legislation has occurred and only 5% of not participating 
respondents agree with this position while 84% of them consider that there have not been no any 
positive change in legislation over last 2-3 years.     
3.3 The portrait of the Russian regional investors relatively to their Critical Success 
Factors’ evaluation  
This paragraph represents a summary of analysis done and results in the Table reflecting 
presence of statistically significant interconnection between business Involvement Status and 
their evaluation of PPP CSFs in the Russian regions. 
When evaluating the attitude of respondents to the PPP Critical Success Factor 
“Financing availability” respondents were to estimate the risk of Termination of Financingdue to 
lack of / lower budget revenue. Statistically significant association between respondents’ 
involvement in provision of public services and the estimated level of risk of Termination of 
Financingis detected for clusters 3 and 4 characterized by lower PPP development environment. 
Moreover, in cluster 3, major level of this risk is more widespread among participators. Analysis 
of this financial risk in clusters 1 and 2 shows that there is no interrelation between project 
Financial Availability and the fact whether respondents participate in provision of public 
services or they do not. 
 For making estimation on interconnection between investors’ involvement and their 
opinion on the quality of tendering (selection process of a private partner) respondents were to 
rate the level of risk of Lobbying and Non-Transparent Selection Process in their regions. As in 
case of appraisal of project Financial Availability importance, participators and non-participators 
in provision of public services in clusters 1 and 2 do not differ significantly by their estimation of 
the level of the quality of selection process. Oppositely, there is difference between those who 
participate in provision of public services and those who do not take a part in their attitude to 
selection process in lower PPP-developed clusters 3 and 4.  
 Interestingly that in cluster 3, participators rank Lobbying and selection risk as major 
more frequently than non-participators do and in cluster 4, there is a little bit higher proportion of 
not participating respondents in terms of “None” risk category, than participating. Besides, not 
participating respondents rank this risk as major less frequently there. Concerning the fact that 
association between participation and risks evaluation is confirmed here, probably, this 
proportion’s distribution demonstrates the situation that respondents who have not taken ever a 
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part in provision of public services could hardly imagine possible obstacles appearing during 
selection process of a partner. 
Analysis of contingency tables and chi-square statistics for evaluation of Social Support 
factor clearly reflects the initial research hypothesis that association between studied categories 
takes a place and non-participators in provision of public services assess presented levels of PPP 
risks higher then participators do. Moreover, the results were not so obvious and demonstrate 
variation of association presence by clusters. In cluster 1 this factor does not relate to 
participation status. Taking into account the fact that this cluster is most PPP developed in the 
survey time period, it is logical to make a suggestion that the quality of public services provided 
by business there is quite good. The other developing clusters demonstrate sensitivity of 
participation in public services to the Social Support. Moreover, participated respondents 
evaluate risks of citizens’ dissatisfaction with public services provided by business lower than 
not participating respondents do evaluate. Such behavior shows that Social Support could be a 
Critical Success Factor when making participation decisions in 2, 3 and 4 clusters. 
The Critical Success Factor “Project Feasibility” incorporating the quality of project 
assessment (realistic Costs and Benefits analysis), clear Client Requirements and Appropriate 
Project Identification, has been defined as PPP Evaluation: Openness and Transparency. 
Respondents were asked to rank Transparency and Openness level of PPP. The statistical test 
shows that this success critical factor matters in all clusters. Moreover, in cluster 3, respondents 
assess Transparency and Openness more positively than it has been done in the other clusters. In 
cluster 2, quite high share of non-participators assign to this risk major category (64%). 
Participators evaluate this risk as major not so often. The very small share of respondents thinks 
that this risk is absent and there almost no not participating respondents who rank risk as none.  
The “Government Support” factor is significant in relation to Involvement Status in all 
clusters. Besides, in clusters 2 and 4 there is a very high share of non-participators who reject 
positive legislation changes. In cluster 2, more than 60% of non-participating respondents think 
that there have been no positive changes, and in 4 clusters, more than 80 % of those not 
participating believe as well that there have been no positive changes. As for cluster 4, the 
percentage of non-participating respondents who acknowledge that there have been positive 
changes has noticeably decreased (only 4% of these). An interesting situation occurs in cluster 3: 
associative link is significant, but there is not much difference between how participating and 
non-participating respondents evaluate legislation changes. 
The Table 5 demonstrates in which cases the interconnection between studied categories 
is statistically significant. 
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Table 5 – PPP Critical Success Factors significant in the Russian regions 
Cluster 
Critical Success Factors 
Availability 
of financing 
Transparent 
Selection 
Process 
Social 
Support 
Government 
Support 
Project 
Feasibility 
Cluster 1 
Saint Petersburg            
Republic of Tatarstan            
Voronezh Region    
Yaroslavl Region 
Belgorod Region           
Nizhni Novgorod Region            
Kaluga Region             
Novosibirsk Region            
Rostov Region            
- - - - + 
Cluster 2  
Sverdlovsk Region            
Moscow City            
Krasnoyarsk Territory            
Krasnodar Territory            
Kirov Region             
Ulyanovsk Region            
Leningrad Region            
Lipetsk Region            
Moscow Region            
- - + + + 
Cluster 3 
Omsk Region            
Samara Region            
Irkutsk Region            
Volgograd Region     
Tomsk Region            
Stavropol Territory  
 Kemerovo Region          
Kursk Region            
Murmansk Region            
+ + + + + 
Cluster 4 
Tver Region            
Chelyabinsk Region            
Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia)            
Smolensk Region            
Republic of 
Bashkortostan            
Perm Territory            
Kaliningrad Region          
Khabarovsk Territory            
Republic of Mordovia            
Primorsky Territory            
+ + + + + 
Source: made by author. 
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Conclusion 
Critical Success Factors are essential elements included in process of achieving project 
goals. They play the role of triggers or necessary conditions boosting successful implementation 
of the project. The project success relies heavily on managers’ maturity on Critical Success 
Factors (Babatunde, Perera, and Lei 2016). In turn, project success is measured through degree 
of achieving desirable outcome of the project. In terms of PPPs, Critical Success Factors are 
important areas to concentrate on for successful PPP project realization. Providing assumption 
that business tends to participate in successful PPP, Critical Success Factors are needed to be 
focused to understand and create PPP climate’s conditions sufficient for attracting investors into 
PPPs. Whether the factor critical or not is defined by subjective judgement of managers (expert 
opinion). The most widespread PPP Critical Success Factors in the literature are Financial 
Availability, Social and Government Support, Project Feasibility and Transparent Selection 
Process. 
Survey respondents are not positive much about the level of development PPP CSFs in 
their regions. Respondents evaluate most frequently social support positively, and, on the 
contrary, government support is least likely to be believed in. The risk of Social Dissatisfaction 
with the quality of public services provided by business is moderate in all clusters. The highest 
proportion of respondents is sure that there have been no any Positive Changes toward PPP 
development in the Regional Legislation over last 2-3 years.  
Interesting that in lower PPP-developed clusters participants tend to believe that Selection 
Process and Financial Availability are on the moderate level. In higher PPP-developed clusters it 
is hardly possible to claim that participators in provision of public services are more positive 
about PPP CSFs condition than non-participators think. Summing up, in less PPP-developed 
clusters participators evaluate factors’ conditions better. Probably, in higher developed clusters 
participators are aware of risks and ready to take them.  
As for the quality of interconnection between respondents’ Involvement Status and their 
estimation of PPP risks (used for assessment of PPP CSFs condition), the association between 
these two categories has been statistically confirmed in following cases. In cluster 1, only Project 
Feasibility matters in decision making about participation in provision of public services. In 
cluster 2, Government and Social Support and Project Feasibility are associated with the 
Involvement Status. In the lower PPP-developed clusters 2 and 4, level of evaluation of all 
observed factors is statistically significant for the fact whether respondents participate in 
provision of public services or do not. Therefore, the higher level of PPP development is the 
fewer factors to which cluster’s respondents are sensitive to.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1. Sample structure by industry sectors 
Figure 1 – Sample structure by industry sectors 
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Appendix 2. Sample structure by most relative to PPP industry sectors 
Figure 2 – Sample structure by most relative to PPP industry sectors 
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Appendix 3. Sample structure by industry regions 
Figure 3 – Sample structure by industry regions 
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